In the early literature, financial crises are driven solely by fundamentals. Recent empirical work documents that while fundamentals play an important role, crises are hard to predict even conditioning on fundamentals. We develop a model in which crises are driven partly by weak fundamentals and partly by herd behavior. The model demonstrates two insights about crises. (1) They act as tests of fire for borrowing countries. Passing such tests (by repaying debt during crises) enhances a country's reputation and capital flows; failing them hurts both. Crises are crucial for identifying financially resilient countries since no such test can occur without a crisis. (2) Bailing out countries in crises involves a new cost: signal-jamming. Bailouts jam signals to investors about the countries' financial resilience and thus deprive resilient countries of the opportunity to enhance their reputations. If unanticipated, bailouts don't involve moral hazard, but they do involve signal-jamming. * The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.
Capital flows into and out of developing countries are volatile: in booms, large amounts of capital flow into the country, while in crises, large amounts of capital flow out. Kaminsky (1999) , among others, documents two key features of financial crises in the data. One is that crises tend to occur in countries in which macroeconomic fundamentals are weak. The other is that crises are hard to predict even with an exhaustive list of macroeconomic fundamentals. We develop a model in which capital flows are volatile, crises tend to occur when macroeconomic fundamentals are weak, and crises are unpredictable even when macroeconomic fundamentals are known. In our model, capital flows are driven partly by weak fundamentals and partly by herd behavior. Investors are uncertain about whether countries can withstand crises. Informational frictions lead capital to stampede toward or away from a country based on small bits of information. Hence, capital flows in our model have the characteristics of hot money.
The early literature on crises, following Krugman (1977) , lays the foundation for the study of financial crises and points to the macroeconomic fundamentals that are likely to play a key role. In this fundamentalist literature, crises are perfectly predictable conditional on macroeconomic fundamentals. (For some recent work in this line, see Atkeson and Ríos-Rull 1996 and Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo 2000.) A body of empirical work establishes that fundamentals play an important role in generating financial crises but that, even so, crises are extremely hard to predict. This literature finds that weak fundamentals help to predict crises, but that even conditioning on fundamentals, a sizeable amount of randomness remains.
Motivated by these types of observations, many economists have argued that financial crises can best be understood with multiple equilibrium models. (See, for example, Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco 1996; Calvo 1998; Chang and Velasco 1998; and Cole and Kehoe 2000.) The multiplicity of equilibria in these models arises from coordination problems. For example, in Cole and Kehoe (2000) , it is optimal for an individual lender to lend if and only if other lenders are lending. These coordination problems lead to financial crises driven by extraneous sunspots.
Recently, Morris and Shin (2000) mounted a compelling critique of multiplicity of equilibria arising from coordination problems. They show that in a large class of coordination games, if agents have an arbitrarily small amount of idiosyncratic private information about fundamentals, there is a unique equilibrium.
These considerations lead us to construct a model that is both consistent with the data and not subject to the Morris-Shin critique. In our model, fundamentals play an important role in generating crises, but a sizeable amount of randomness remains. Moreover, the crises do not occur because of multiplicity of equilibria.
Our model has two types of government: a competent, or resilient, type, which can efficiently deal with crises, and an incompetent type, which cannot. In the model's equilibrium, the competent type never defaults on its debt while the incompetent type does default, but only during crises. This feature captures the idea that in normal times, different types of government may perform equally well, but a crisis reveals their true nature: some governments crack under the pressure while others do not.
In our model, lenders don't know which type of government they are dealing with.
Each of the lenders has a choice: either invest in the rest of the world at a given rate of return or commit to investing some fixed amount in a project in the borrowing country. That project is syndicated; in order to proceed, a minimal number of lenders must participate.
Lenders receive private signals about the possibility of an upcoming crisis in the borrowing country. We model informational frictions by assuming that lenders are ordered in a sequence, and they sequentially decide whether or not to commit to funding the project. We show that when there is substantial uncertainty about the government's competence, capital flows are extremely sensitive to small bits of information: a small number of signals sets off herd behavior-good signals, a stampede of capital inflows, and bad signals, a stampede of capital outflows.
The model produces both volatile capital flows and the two key features of crises documented by Kaminsky (1999) . We show that capital flows are volatile relative to a frictionless economy in which markets somehow aggregate information perfectly. Fundamentals play an important role in generating crises: capital outflows are more likely when fundamentals are weak, and capital inflows are more likely when fundamentals are strong. But even when fundamentals are weak, crises are hard to predict. Capital flows in or out depending on the detailed pattern of the realization of signals across investors.
Our model suggests that herd behavior will be most common when uncertainty about a government's resilience is large. If investors are confident about the resilience of the government in a crisis, they do not worry about default, and a steady stream of capital flows into the country. Similarly, if investors have no confidence in a country's resilience, fears about default prevent any capital flows.
Using this feature, we show that the model provides two insights about crises. One is that they act as tests of fire for borrowing countries. Passing such tests (by repaying debt during crises) enhances a country's reputation and capital flows; failing them hurts both.
Crises are crucial for identifying financially resilient countries since no such test can occur without a crisis.
The other insight is that bailing out countries in crises involves a new cost: signaljamming. Bailouts by outside agents jam signals to investors about the countries' financial resilience and thus deprive resilient countries of the opportunity to enhance their reputations.
If unanticipated, bailouts don't involve moral hazard, but they do involve signal-jamming.
The model itself has many antecedents. Our modelling of the lenders builds on elements of the literature on herd behavior. (See, for example, Banerjee 1992; Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch 1992; Lee 1993; Caplin and Leahy 1994; and Chamley and Gale 1994.) Our modelling of the government builds on elements from the debt default literature with signalling. (See, for example, Bhattacharya and Detragiache 1994; Cole, Dow, and English 1995; and some of the numerous articles surveyed by Eaton and Fernandez 1995.) Our study is complementary to recent work on financial crises by Calvo and Mendoza (1996) . The basic idea in their work is that if individuals are highly diversified, then investment in a country is highly sensitive to news about the country, and individual investors have little incentive to pay a fixed cost to keep up to date on each of their investments. Thus, international capital flows may be volatile. This theoretical framework leads one to expect that all countries will be subject to volatile capital flows. Ours does not. We emphasize that only countries with questionable reputations are subject to volatile capital flows. And we emphasize that countries can establish a reputation for resilience by passing a test of fire.
The Unpredictability of Crises
The empirical work on crises shows that countries with weak macroeconomic fundamentals tend to have crises but that this association is far from perfect. Even conditioning on fundamentals, crises are hard to predict. (See the extensive references in Goldstein, Kaminsky, and Reinhart 2000.) For example, Kaminsky (1999) develops an exhaustive list of indicators of crises for 20 countries encompassing 102 financial crises. The indicators are those suggested by the fundamentalist literature. She divides the sample into precrisis times, defined as 24-month windows before crises, and tranquil times, defined as all other times. Using these indicators, she constructs the probability that a crisis will occur in the next 24 months. She finds that, on average, the probability of a crisis occurring is .39 in precrisis times and .19 in tranquil times. That is, on average, her model mistakenly forecasts no crisis 61 percent of the time in precrisis times and mistakenly forecasts a crisis 19 percent of the time in tranquil times.
As an illustration, consider Figure 1 , which displays the probability that a crisis will occur in the next 24 months for Malaysia. Crises occurred in July 1975 and July 1997.
The shaded areas indicate the precrisis times. Notice that before the 1975 crisis, the model predicts a relatively low probability of a crisis, but one occurs. In the mid-1980s, the model predicts a high probability of a crisis, but none occurs. In sum, while the data show that fundamentals play an important role, clearly a very sizeable amount of randomness remains.
This type of empirical work cannot definitively establish that no version of the fundamentalist view could ever account for the observations. Indeed, it is possible that future empirical work may greatly reduce the extent of unpredictability of crises. Our point is that, given the best current measures and methods, factors other than macroeconomic fundamentals seem to play an important role in generating financial crises.
Lender Behavior
We begin with a description of lender behavior during one period of the dynamic economy, with a default rule for the government simply given. In the next section, we build a maximizing model of government behavior and provide sufficient conditions for this assumed behavior to be optimal.
A. The Model
We develop a model of a small open economy in which a government borrows from both domestic and foreign lenders to fund a project. There are V one-period-lived riskneutral lenders, fraction α of whom are domestic and fraction (1 − α) of whom are foreign.
(We include domestic lenders so that a failure to fund the project corresponds to capital flight.) The government has access to a country-specific project and has no endowments, so it must borrow to fund the project. Investment occurs at the beginning of the period, and returns are realized at the end of the period. Each of the lenders either can commit to investing some fixed amount a in the project and earn a return R if the loan is eventually repaid or can invest in the rest of the world and earn a sure return R * . The government's project is indivisible and is funded if and only if N lenders commit to funding it. The gross return to the project is r = RNa. The government can either default on the debt or not default. We let τ = 1 denote default and τ = 0 denote no default.
The country's economy can either be in a normal (or good) state, denoted by G, or in a crisis (in a bad state), denoted by B. Normal states occur with probability µ G while crises occur with probability µ B . The government can be either competent or incompetent.
A government's type, however, is not known to lenders: it is the private information of the government. For now, we assume that in a normal state, neither type of government defaults, while in a crisis, only an incompetent government defaults.
All lenders have a prior belief π 0 that the borrowing government is competent. Initially, the state of the country is unknown. During a period, lenders get signals about the state.
Each lender gets one of two possible signals s ∈ {G, B}: that the economy is in a normal state or that the economy is in a crisis. The signals are informative and symmetric in the sense that
where g ∈ {G, B} denotes the state. (Note that these signals are about the exogenous random variable g and not about the types.)
We assume that the lenders are in a sequence, ordered 1, 2, 3, and so on. In each period t, there are V stages, or subperiods, with v = 1, . . . , V and V < 2N. For concreteness, let V = 2N − 1. In stage v, the vth lender receives a signal, observes the decisions of earlier lenders in the sequence, and decides to either commit to funding the project or not. If N or more lenders commit to funding the project, then the project is funded, and the first N lenders each invest a fixed amount. If fewer than N lenders in the sequence commit to funding, then the project is not funded, the commitments are nullified, and these lenders are free to invest in the rest of the world. We think of this setup as a simple way to capture some of the features of syndicated loans in which a certain number of investors must participate for a project to be funded.
The overall timing of events within the period is as follows. First, lenders receive their signals about the state of the economy, whether it is in a normal state or in a crisis, and they sequentially make their lending decisions. As a result, the project is either funded or not funded. If the project is funded the country experiences a capital inflow of (1 − α)Na while if the project is not funded the country experiences a capital outflow of αNa. Second, the state is realized and made known to all. Finally, if the project is funded, the government decides whether to default or not on lenders' claims.
Consider the investment decision of the lender. Since a lender's commitment is nullified if the project is not funded, what matters to the lender is the probability of being repaid, conditional on the project eventually being funded. This probability is given by λ+(1− λ)π 0 , where λ is the probability that the economy is in a normal state conditional on the project eventually being funded. To understand this conditional probability of repayment, note that with probability λ, the economy will be in a normal state and both types of government will repay, and with probability 1 − λ, the economy will be in a crisis and only a competent government will repay. (Note that λ may differ from the lender's current prior probability that the state is normal, which we denote by p.) For an arbitrary conditional probability λ, each lender's decision to commit to fund the project or not solves
The optimal policy has this form: Invest by setting x = 1 if λ ≥ λ * and not otherwise, where the cutoff conditional probability for investment, λ * , is defined by
Here we have shown that given the conditional probability λ, the investment decision is straightforward. The delicate part of describing an equilibrium is the details of how the conditional probability λ evolves as a function of a lender's observations.
To construct an equilibrium for our model, we must specify how lenders' beliefs evolve as a function of what they observe. We will specify lenders' beliefs over p, the probability that the state of the economy is normal, given their observations, and then use the investment strategies to induce the conditional probability λ that the state will be normal if the project is In constructing an equilibrium, we will find it useful to first define beliefs p v (h v ) given some public history h v and then use them to construct each lender's beliefs. For arbitrary beliefs p, we find it useful to use Bayes' rule to define P G (p) and P B (p) as the updated beliefs that the state is good given that signals G and B were received:
where q is defined in (1). Let P (0) = p 0 , P (1) = P G (P (0)), P (2) = P G (P (1)), and so on, and let P (−1) = P B (P (0)), P (−2) = P B (P (−1)), and so on. Thus, P (k) for k > 0 is the prior probability that the state is good if k good signals have been received, and P (k) for k < 0 is the prior probability that the state is good if k bad signals have been received. Notice from the symmetry in (1) that
It follows from (5) 
B. Equilibrium

B.1. One Region
We now focus on the region of the parameter space that satisfies this assumption:
where, recall, λ * is the cutoff probability for investment. Recall that beliefs can only take on values P (k) for some integer k. Thus, a lender will invest if the probability that the state is good, conditional on the project being funded, is at least as high as the original prior P (0), and a lender will not invest if the probability that the state is good, conditional on the project being funded, is less than or equal to P (−1).
Now we describe, informally, the outcomes of the equilibrium that we will construct. More formally, we proceed as follows. The strategy for the vth lender is
Let the beliefs of lender v be defined by
, need only be defined for x v = 1, since for x v = 0, they are irrelevant for the lender's payoffs. These probabilities are given by
For values of p v (h v ) less than P (−1), let λ v = P (−1) regardless of the signal; for values of p v (h v ) greater than P (1), let λ v = P (1) regardless of the signal. As we will show in the proof, these conditional probabilities are induced by the strategies of lenders later in the sequence.
Notice that, for simplicity, we have constructed an equilibrium in which strategies depend only on the probability that a state is good and not on time or on the number of lenders who have previously invested.
Built into these beliefs is the idea that lenders look at past lenders' actions and try to infer their signals. On the equilibrium path, lenders infer the following. If a lender in v takes an action which is consistent with that lender having received a good signal but not consistent with that lender having received a bad signal, then all future lenders infer that a good signal was received. Inferences are made similarly for actions consistent with a bad signal but not with a good signal. If a lender takes an action which is consistent with both a good signal and a bad signal, then future lenders infer nothing. Finally, off the equilibrium path, if a lender takes an action which is consistent with neither a good signal nor a bad signal, then future lenders infer nothing.
We then have the following proposition: Proposition 1. Under assumption (6), the constructed strategies, beliefs, and conditional probabilities constitute a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Proof. Clearly, the constructed beliefs satisfy Bayes' rule. We repeatedly use the observation that by construction, for any history h v , p v (h v ) = P (k) for some integer k.
Suppose that the lender in v faces a public history with prior P (0). If this lender receives a good signal, then the lender's prior increases to P (1). Under the equilibrium, the lender invests-and so do all future lenders, regardless of their signals. Hence, the conditional probability that the state is good given that the project is funded, λ, is also P (1). Under assumption (6), deviating to not investing gives a strictly lower expected return. Now suppose that in v, with the same public history and prior P (0), this lender receives a bad signal. The lender's prior decreases to P (−1), and the lender is supposed to not invest.
If the lender deviates to investing, then other lenders infer that the deviating lender received a good signal, and their beliefs rise to P (1). The beliefs of other lenders are two levels higher than that of the deviating lender because that lender's private signal lowered his beliefs by 1 while the lender's investment raised the other lenders' beliefs by 1. Given these beliefs, all future lenders invest regardless of their signals. Thus, the deviating lender believes that if he invests, the conditional probability λ will equal P (−1). By (6), then, investing is not optimal.
Suppose now that a lender in v faces a public history with prior P (−1). If this lender receives a good signal, then the lender's prior increases to P (0). Under the equilibrium, the lender invests, and under our strategies, the project will be funded only if the prior eventually reaches P (1). By (6), then, here investing is optimal. To see that the project will be funded only if the prior eventually reaches P (1), note that if it alternates between P (0) and P (−1), investments will alternate between 1 and 0 and there will be at most V /2 < N investments, so the project will not be funded. Hence, if the project is to be funded, the prior must eventually hit P (1), where all future investors will invest. (Note that here p = P (0), but λ = P (1).)
If the lender at a public history with prior P (−1) receives a bad signal, then the lender's prior decreases to P (−2), and the lender is not supposed to invest. If the lender deviates and invests anyway, other lenders infer that the deviating lender received a good signal, and their priors increase to P (0) (which is two levels higher than that of the deviating lender). The project will eventually be funded only if the beliefs of these future lenders increase one more level to P (1), in which case the deviator's beliefs increase one level to P (−1). Thus, the deviator's conditional probability λ is P (−1), and by (6), this deviation is unprofitable.
For public histories in v with priors P (1) or higher, the lender in v is supposed to invest regardless of the signal received. Under our strategies and beliefs, future lenders also invest regardless of their signals. Hence, this lender's λ = P (1). By (6), now, investing is optimal.
For public histories in v with priors P (−2) or lower, the lender in v is supposed to not invest regardless of the signal. If the lender deviates and invests, (8) implies that other lenders ignore this deviation and do not invest regardless of their signals. Thus, this lender has no incentive to deviate from not investing. Q.E.D.
B.2. Public vs. Private Information
Next we demonstrate why we think the investment stampedes can be considered flows of hot money. To do that, we show that there are two senses in which the capital flows described above are excessively volatile. We compare the flows to the benchmark behavior in a public information version of the above game, one in which all signals are public rather than private. First, we show that the stampedes we saw in the private information game are informationally driven in the sense that they would not occur in the public information economy. Second, we show that the variance of capital flows is larger in the private information game than in the benchmark economy.
Informationally Driven Stampedes. In the public information version of the game, as before, all lenders receive their signals in period 1, and the lender in v chooses whether to invest in v. All lenders have access to the same set of signals, namely, s V = (s 1 , . . . , s V ). We focus on equilibria in which the strategies depend only on s V and the strategy for a lender in v is a function z v (s V ), which has the value of 1 if the lender invests and 0 otherwise. Let
denote the number of good signals minus the number of bad signals in the history
We say that an outcome path (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x N ) is a herd if it is informationally driven, in the sense that there is a history of signals for which actions taken in the private information game do not coincide with those of the public information game. Formally, (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x N ) is a herd if there is a history of signals s V such that
where h v = (x 1 , . . . , x v−1 ) for v ≥ 1 and h 1 = ∅. We say that an outcome path (
is a herd of capital inflows if the path is a herd and there is some v < V such that x s = 1 for all s ≥ v. Likewise, an outcome path (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x V ) is a herd of capital outflows if the path is a herd and there is some v < V such that x s = 0 for all s ≥ v. Intuitively, we mean these definitions to capture the idea that herds are stampedes of capital flows into or out of a country, movements of capital which might be driven by frictions in information transmission.
(Note that we use the term herd to capture both the idea of a cascade, or stampede, in which lenders take the same action regardless of their signal, as in Banerjee 1992 or Bikhchandani,
Hirshleifer, and Welch 1992, and the idea that the actions are inefficient relative to some benchmark.)
We now can state Propositions 2 and 3, which we prove in the Appendix.
Proposition 2. The equilibrium has both herds of capital inflows and herds of capital outflows.
Now we show that herds can occur often when V is large. Using the central limit theorem, we see that when V is large, the equilibrium of the public information games converges in probability to the equilibrium of the game in which the underlying state of the economy is known. We use this result to show Proposition 3. For large V, a stampede of capital inflows is a herd of capital inflows with probability approximately 1 − P (1), and a stampede of capital outflows is a herd of capital outflows with probability approximately P (−2).
Fundamentals vs. Informational Frictions.
We turn now to the sense in which capital flows are driven partly by informational flows and partly by informational frictions. We also show the sense in which capital flows are excessively volatile.
In the private information game, for a prior π 0 such that assumption (6) holds, the project is funded after histories of the form (1), (0, 1, 1), . . . , (0, 1, . . . , 0, 1, 1). Conditional on the state being G, these histories have probability
Conditional on the state being B, these histories have probability
In our model, capital flows are driven partly by fundamentals and partly by informational frictions. We think of the underlying state of the economy and the prior on the government as capturing the fundamentals. We think of the difference in the outcomes from the public and private information games as resulting from informational frictions.
In the public information game with large V, capital flows are driven by fundamentals:
in the good state, funds flow in with probability one, and in the bad state, funds flow out with probability one. In the private information game, in the good state, funds flow in with probability p G , and in the bad state, funds flow out with probability p B . Since 1/2 < p G < 1, it is more likely but not certain that capital flows in when the state is good. Since 1/2 < 1 − p B < 1, it is more likely but not certain that capital flows out when the state is bad.
In this sense, capital flows are driven partly by fundamentals and partly by informational frictions.
Capital flows are also more volatile in our private information game than in our public information game. In the public information game, conditional on the state, the variance of capital flows is zero. In the private information game, conditional on the state, the variance of capital flows in the good state is p G (1−p G ), and the variance in the bad state is p B (1−p B ).
We summarize this discussion as follows.
Proposition 4. For large V, capital flows are driven partly by fundamentals and partly by informational frictions. Also, the variance of capital flows conditional on the fundamentals is larger in the private information game than in the public information game.
Note that the unconditional variance of capital flows can also be higher in the private informational game than in the public information game. When V is large, the unconditional variance of capital flows in the public information game is µ G µ B . In the private information game, this variance is
then the variance is higher in the private information game than in the public information game. Notice that when µ B approaches zero, the ratio of the variance of capital flows in the private information game becomes arbitrarily large relative to that in the public information game.
B.3. Other Regions
So far we have derived the behavior of the lenders when π 0 is such that assumption (6) holds. Here we describe the equilibrium for other regions of the parameter space.
To that end, letπ be the prior such that if λ = P (−1), the lender is indifferent between investing and not investing; that is,π satisfies
Likewise, letπ be the prior that makes the lender indifferent at λ = P (0) and π be the prior that makes the lender indifferent at λ = P (1). Then the points π,π,π satisfy 0 < π <π < π < 1. Figure 2 displays how lenders behave in equilibrium when their prior beliefs are of various sizes. When π 0 satisfies assumption (6), π 0 ∈ [π,π], the herds are of the type described above and are labeled in the figure as type I herds. For π 0 ∈ [0, π), no lending occurs, and for π 0 ∈ (π, 1], lending always occurs. For π 0 ∈ (π,π), there is an equilibrium similar to that described above, except that now two good signals are needed to set off a stampede of capital inflows and only one bad signal is needed to set off a stampede of capital outflows. The figure labels these herds type II. In this equilibrium, stampedes of capital inflows occur after histories of the form (1, 1), (1, 0, 1, 1), . . . , (1, 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0, 1, 1) while stampedes of capital outflows occur after histories of the form (0), (1, 0, 0), . . . , (1, 0, 1, 0, . . . , 1, 0, 0).
From the government's perspective, the lenders' decisions are summarized by the probability of investing conditional on the realization of g given the lenders' priors π. We let p G (π) and p B (π) denote these probabilities conditional on the realizations of government spending G and B, respectively. In the equilibrium we construct, there are only three relevant priors, the initial prior π 0 and priors of 0 and 1. For these priors, the conditional probabilities of lending for g = G, B are
where p G and p B are given by (9) and (10), respectively.
Here we have focused on one type of equilibrium. There clearly are other types. We discuss these in the Appendix.
Endogenous Government Behavior
So far we have worked out the behavior of the lenders in our model assuming a particular default rule of the government. Here we work out the optimal behavior of an infinitely lived government. We construct a simple maximizing model of endogenous government behavior which captures the idea that both types of government do equally well at governing during normal times, but a competent government is better than an incompetent one at dealing with a crisis. After we set up this version of the model, we find conditions under which a government will optimally choose to follow the default rule set down above. Then we derive two insights provided by our model.
A. The Model
The dynamic economy is as follows. There are an infinite number of periods, indexed t = 0, 1, .... The timing and information structure within each period is the same as before. The lenders live one period and, hence, face exactly the same problem as before. The interesting agent now is the government.
The state of the economy follows an exogenously given i.i.d. process over a normal state with probability µ G and a crisis state with probability µ B . In a crisis, the government must provide services above and beyond those provided in normal times. We denote the level of normal services by G and the level of crisis services by B. The government must finance spending on crisis services with a combination of taxes on loans and distorting domestic taxes. The tax rates on loans τ t ∈ {0, 1}, so that τ t = 1 corresponds to default. Tax revenue consists of revenue from domestic taxes, T, plus revenue from taxes on investment, τ x, where the level of investment x ∈ {0, r}.
During normal times, both types of government can govern equally well, but during a crisis, the types differ in how efficiently they can transform tax revenue, T + τ x, into government services. (For a related setup, see Rogoff and Sibert 1988.) Since both types of government are equally efficient in normal times, for simplicity we normalize the level of government services that need to be provided in normal times to be G = 0. During a crisis, however, both types need to provide a level of services equal to B. We assume that a government of type i = C, I (for competent and incompetent) provides θ i units of services for each one unit of revenue it receives. We normalize θ C = 1 and assume that θ I < 1. In this sense, our model captures the idea that only during difficult times do the major differences between the two types of government materialize.
In the crisis state, the government's budget constraint is
In the normal state, when G = 0, tax revenue is distributed in a lump-sum fashion to workers.
We capture the distortions associated with domestic taxes by letting output be a decreasing function of domestic tax revenue T, denoted y(T ) as long as T is positive and y(T ) = y(0) otherwise. If a project is funded, it generates extra income of wr for the domestic workers.
This extra income represents the benefits to the country of having a project. Consumption of domestic workers is given by
where, again, investment x ∈ {0, r} where r = RN a. The period utility function of the government is linear in the consumption of domestic workers. For algebraic simplicity, we assume that the government does not care about the consumption of domestic lenders. From (13) and (14) it follows that the period utility of government i-expressed as a function of the government's spending level g, the investment level x, and the default decision τ -is given by
We focus on a Markov equilibrium in which government strategies and lender updating rules depend only on the state variables π, g, and x. The government takes as given the lending probabilities (12) and chooses the default decision τ to solve
is the updating rule for the prior and
is the value function for government i. Here it is understood that if x = 0, so that the amount owed to lenders is 0, then the default decision is irrelevant to payoffs. This dynamic programming problem gives us decision rules of the form τ i (π, g, x).
The timing of events within a period is as follows. First, the lenders receive signals about the state of the economy and make commitments to lend. Second, the government spends to provide some level of services, and it is publicly revealed whether there is a crisis or times are normal. Third, the government makes its taxation and default decisions. And finally, private agents consume. We assume that the government's default decision is publicly revealed, but that lenders do not observe domestic tax revenue. (This latter assumption prevents the lenders from inferring the government's type in a crisis by using (13).)
Now a perfect Bayesian equilibrium consists of default rules for the competent and incompetent types of government, τ C (·) and τ I (·); an updating rule Π(·) for the prior; and probability of lending rules p G (·) and p B (·) such that (i) given the updating and lending rules, the default rules solves the government's dynamic programming problem; (ii) the probability of lending rules are consistent with the optimality of lenders' decisions given their beliefs;
and (iii) the updating rule satisfies Bayes' rule whenever possible.
We focus on an equilibrium in which the two types of government pool in normal times and separate in crises. More precisely, we focus on equilibria in which in normal times neither type of government defaults if π = π 0 or 1 and both types default if π = 0, while in crises only the incompetent type defaults if π = π 0 or 1 and both default if π = 0. In our construction of an equilibrium, we only define strategies and updating rules at the initial prior π 0 , together with priors of 0 and 1. While it is straightforward to define strategies and updating rules for all priors, none of these other priors can be reached regardless of the behavior of the lenders or the government.
Formally, the strategies are τ C (π, g, 1) = 0 if π ∈ {π 0 , 1} and g ∈ {G, B} and τ C (π, g, 1) = 1 otherwise, while τ I (π, g, 1) = 0 if π ∈ {π 0 , 1} and g = G and τ I (π, g, 1) = 1 otherwise. The updating rule for beliefs Π(π, g, x, r) is, for x = r,
and, trivially, for x = 0, Π(π, g, 0, τ ) = π, for all g and τ .
Along the equilibrium path, the behavior is as follows. Starting from the initial prior, both types of government repay in normal times, and the prior is unaffected. At the first realization of a crisis, the competent government repays and the incompetent government defaults. The priors move to 1 and 0, respectively. After this separation of the types, lenders invest with probability 1 with the competent government in all future periods, and this government never defaults. Lenders never again invest with the incompetent government.
1
For these conjectured strategies and beliefs to constitute an equilibrium, certain inequalities must hold. We will develop these inequalities and show that they hold under the following two assumptions:
Notice that in (16) the expression on the left side of the first inequality sign is greater than the expression on the right side of the second inequality if the function y(·) is concave and decreasing. That function is concave if the marginal cost of raising taxes is increasing in tax revenues. Assumption (16) is more likely to be satisfied, then, the more concave is the function y(·) and the smaller is the competency parameter θ. Assumption (17) is more likely to be satisfied the larger is β.
Note that if the current prior is zero, then no one lends and the new prior is also zero regardless of the current actions. Clearly, then, in either state, both the competent and the incompetent types of government default when the prior is zero. Of course, a prior of zero is off the equilibrium path for the competent government. Thus, the only interesting priors are those of π 0 and 1.
We prove the following proposition in the Appendix.
Proposition 5. Under assumptions (16) and (17), the constructed strategies and beliefs constitute a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
B. The Necessity of Crises for Signalling
Our model is predicated on the idea that a crisis provides an opportunity for a competent government to signal its competency by taking actions which are too costly for an incompetent government to mimic. As such, we argue that crises act as tests of fire that determine the true nature of a government. But is there some other way for the government to signal its competency-say, by taking some costly action in normal times which would work just as well? We say, no, because in normal times, whatever a competent government would like to do to separate itself, an incompetent government would like to do at least as much-and can. Therefore, for a true separating test, a crisis is needed.
Consider a candidate test in normal times. Suppose there were an equilibrium in which during normal times, the competent government took a costly action to signal that it was competent. One could interpret this action in many ways. One could think of it, for example, as some domestic reform that is costly but might act as a show of good faith.
For concreteness, suppose that there is some signalling payment z made to some foreign entity that proves to lenders that the government is competent. If this payment successfully signals the government type, then the competent government will have an incentive to make the payment while the incompetent government will not. If this is so, then for a government that starts in normal times with a prior of π 0 , making the payment causes the prior to move to 1 while not making it causes the prior to move to 0. Now suppose that the payment of z successfully signals the competent government's type in normal times when there has been investment. Then the competent government must prefer to make the payment and have a prior of 1 rather than not make the payment and have a prior of 0. Thus,
Here V C (1) and V C (0) denote the continuation values of a competent government with a prior of 1 and 0, respectively. Note that with a prior of 1, funds always flow in and the competent government never defaults, so its continuation payoff is given by
With a prior of 0, funds never flow in, and the continuation payoff is given by
Moreover, an incompetent government must prefer to not make the payment signalling competency, so that
Here V I (1) and V I (0) are continuation payoffs for the incompetent government associated with priors of 1 and 0, respectively. With a prior of 0, funds never flow in, and the continuation payoff is given by
With a prior of 1, funds flow in today. Tomorrow, under the equilibrium strategies, the incompetent government repays and keeps the prior of 1 in the normal state, while it defaults and gets a new prior of 0 in the crisis state. Hence, the continuation payoffs are
Notice that if we considered a normal state without investment, the only change would be that wr would not appear on either side of (18) or (21), so that the inequalities would be unaffected.
We then have Proposition 6. Under (16), a government cannot make payments to signal its competency in normal times.
Proof. To show that (18) and (21) cannot hold, it suffices to show that
If such a signalling equilibrium existed, an incompetent government would have an incentive to deviate and actually make the payment. Using (31) and (42) from the Appendix, we can write (24) as
which can be reduced to
The result then follows from (16). Q.E.D.
C. The Cost of Bailouts: Signal-Jamming
Here we discuss the effects on equilibrium outcomes of outside agencies bailing out governments apparently about to default on debt. We show that such bailouts in crises can interfere with the signalling process to the market-bailouts jam the signals to investors about the type of government they have invested in. Thus, while bailouts may have shortterm benefits, they impose long-term costs on the country being bailed out. We argue that these signal-jamming costs can arise even if a bailout is unanticipated.
To make these benefits and costs concrete, suppose that an economy is in a crisis state, that state has been revealed, and the government is on the verge of defaulting on its debt.
Suppose that an outside agency undertakes a one-time unanticipated bailout by making a gift of r units of goods to the government earmarked for repaying investors for their claims r.
This bailout clearly has short-term benefits: with it, both types of government can reduce their distortionary taxes in the crisis by r. For the incompetent government, the bailout also has long-term benefits: without it, this type of government would reveal its type by defaulting, while with the bailout, it can conceal its type by not defaulting. For the competent government, however, the bailout has long-term costs: without the bailout, this type of government would reveal its type by repaying, while with the bailout, it is deprived of the opportunity to signal its type.
For the competent government, there is a tradeoff between the bailout's short-term benefits of tax reduction and the bailout's long-term costs of signal-jamming. For this government, the value of utility under a bailout is
since the government is able to reduce its distorting taxes by r but investors' priors stay at π 0 . Here V C (π 0 ) is the continuation utility of a competent government with a prior of π 0 .
The utility without a bailout is
Thus, the government has higher tax rates in the current period, but investors' priors move to 1. The short-term benefits
arise because the government needs to raise less tax revenue, which has the direct effect of raising consumption by r and the indirect effect of allowing the government to lower distortions and thus raise output. The long-term costs are
These arise since the bailout interferes with the market mechanism that allows the competent government to signal its type and raise its prior from π 0 to 1. By jamming that signal, these bailouts lead the competent government to remain in the region with herds and volatile capital flows instead of moving to a region with no herds and smooth capital flows. Only when the next crisis occurs is the government able to signal its type. Using (31) and (35) from the Appendix, we can derive that these costs equal
We summarize this discussion as follows:
Proposition 7. Bailouts of governments have short-term benefits, but even if unanticipated, they have long-term costs.
The point of Proposition 7 is that while bailouts may well benefit both types of government, they impose a cost. In the literature, most attention has been focused on the moral hazard costs of bailouts. If bailouts are unanticipated, they do not lead to moral hazard. We show that even unanticipated bailouts impose another type of cost, arising from signal-jamming, that has not received attention.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have constructed a simple model of how frictions in international financial markets combined with standard debt default problems can lead to volatile capital flows, or movements of hot money. We have demonstrated that these times of financial crisis act as tests of fire for borrowing countries. If a country survives such a test, its reputation is enhanced and capital flows into the country become less volatile. Failing such a test is associated with a loss of reputation and a decline in capital flows. Moreover, we have identified a previously unrecognized cost of bailouts, signal-jamming, which arises even if bailouts are unanticipated.
Our purpose here has been to fill a gaping hole in the literature on financial crises. The conventional wisdom (backed up by recent empirical work) is that even in models conditioned on fundamentals, there is a large random component to capital flows into and out of developing countries. The preeminent models of this phenomenon rely on coordination problems that lead to multiple equilibria. This kind of multiplicity is not appealing after Morris and Shin's (2000) powerful critique. Our model generates the large random component without relying on multiplicity of equilibria.
In formalizing the conventional wisdom, we have modelled international financial market frictions in the simplest way needed to generate herd behavior-that is, as arising from impediments in information-sharing across lenders. Future work should develop deeper models of private incentives to share information. (For some preliminary work on this issue, see Chari and Kehoe 1999.) Here we prove Propositions 2, 3, and 5 and then discuss other types of equilibria. It is easy to see that, more generally, any stampede of capital inflows or of capital outflows is a herd. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3. Recall that any investment pattern in which there is some v < V, such that x s = 1 for all s ≥ v, is a stampede of capital inflows. This stampede is a herd of capital inflows if it is informationally driven relative to the public information game.
Using the central limit theorem, we can compare the equilibrium of the private information game to the one in which the underlying state of the economy is known.
Consider the event in which the first lender gets a good signal and sets off a stampede of capital inflows in the private information game. We will show that this stampede is a herd with probability 1 − P (1). To see this, suppose first that the underlying state is bad.
Conditional on the first lender getting a good signal, the state is bad with probability 1−P (1), and the state is good with probability P (1). Since the outcomes in the public information game approximately coincide with those when the state is known, the probability of investment in the public information game is approximately 0 when the state is bad and approximately 1 when the state is good. Thus, this type of stampede is informationally driven with probability approximately 1−P (1). This argument immediately generalizes to other stampedes of capital inflows, such as those following (0,1,1), (0,1,0,1,1), and so on.
Consider next the event in which the first two lenders get bad signals and set off a stampede of capital outflows. Conditional on this event, the underlying state is good with probability P (−2) and bad with probability 1 − P (−2). Since the outcomes in the public information game approximately coincide with those when the state is known, this type of stampede is informationally driven with probability approximately P (−2). This argument immediately generalizes to other stampedes of capital outflows, such as those following (0,1,0,0), (0,1,0,1,0,0), and so on. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5. We begin by analyzing the behavior of a competent government.
In the crisis state with a prior of π 0 or 1, this type of government is supposed to repay and get a new prior of 1 rather than default and get a new prior of 0. For this to be true, it must be that
which can be rearranged as
Here V C (1) and V C (0) are continuation payoffs associated with priors of 1 and 0, respectively.
These continuation payoffs are the present value of expected discounted utilities from the next period onward under the equilibrium strategies. We will show that
To see this, note that with a prior of 1, funds always flow in and the competent government never defaults, so its continuation payoff is given by
Subtracting (32) from (31) and rearranging terms gives the desired equation:
Now consider the competent government in the normal state with a prior of π 0 . For this government to repay at π 0 and continue with this prior rather than default and have a new prior of 0, it must be that
The continuation payoff V C (π 0 ) is implicitly defined by
and V C (0) is given in (32). To understand (35), recall that with probability µ B p B , a crisis occurs and the government receives funds from lenders for its project. In this event, the competent government repays the lenders and gets a new prior of 1. In the other three events, no information is revealed. The government receives the current payoff under the equilibrium strategy for that event and a continuation payoff V C (π 0 ).
To establish (34), note first that since the continuation payoffs are increasing in the
. Using this inequality in (35) and rearranging gives
Subtracting (32) from (36) and rearranging terms gives
Together, then, (37) and (17) imply (34).
In the normal state with a prior of 1, there is a similar inequality for the competent government. Since the continuation payoff is increasing in the prior, this inequality is automatically satisfied whenever (34) holds.
Next we analyze the behavior of an incompetent government. In the crisis state with a prior of either π 0 or 1, this type of government is supposed to default and have a new prior Hence, (39) follows from (16).
Next, in the normal state, the incompetent government is supposed to repay with priors of π 0 and 1. Clearly, if the government repays with a prior of π 0 , it will repay with a prior of 1; hence, we need only consider a prior of π 0 . Under this prior, the government is supposed to repay and keep the prior π 0 rather than default and get a new prior of 1. Hence, we must have y(0) + wr + βV I (π 0 ) ≥ y(0) + wr + r + βV
which can be rearranged to be From (16) and (17) it follows that
while from (17) it follows that
Substituting (48) and (49) into (47) and doing some algebra gives that it suffices to show that
which holds since µ G p G + µ B p B < 1. Thus, (45) To see that these strategies and beliefs constitute an equilibrium, consider first the behavior of any one of the first N − 1 lenders. If one of these lenders-say, lender v-receives the signal s v = B, then this lender's beliefs about the state p is P (−1), but what is relevant for this lender is the corresponding conditional probability λ. Since lender v knows that lender N will invest if and only if s N = G, the corresponding λ is P (0), and by assumption (6) investing is optimal for lender v. A similar argument holds for any such lender v who receives the signal s v = G. Consider the behavior of the Nth lender. Clearly, the actions of the previous lenders have no information. If s N = G, then both this lender's prior p and the lender's conditional probability are P (1), while if s N = B, both p and λ are P (−1). Under (6), the presumed behavior is clearly optimal.
Of course, there are permutations of the type of equilibrium just discussed and that focused on above. For example, consider an equilibrium which is the same as our original equilibrium except that at some arbitrary stages v 1 , . . . , v K at a prior of P (0), lenders invest regardless of their signals. With the obvious corresponding beliefs, this behavior will also constitute an equilibrium.
Note that the nature of the syndicated loan aspect of our model leads to an interdependence of strategies which differs from that of the simple herd models of Banerjee (1992) and Bikchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992) . This interdependence leads our model to have multiple equilibria arising from informational problems while in the simple herd models a unique equilibrium exists.
Notice also that since a project can be funded in our model if and only if at least N lenders invest, our model has a strong type of strategic complementarity. This type of strategic complementarity is the source of multiple equilibria in many simultaneous move games. To see how in a simultaneous move game this type of strategic complementarity gives rise to multiple equilibria driven by coordination problems, consider a full information version of our game in which the state is known but all lenders make simultaneous decisions. Clearly, there are equilibria in which N lenders invest as well as equilibria in which no one invests just because no one else is investing. Given these two types of equilibria, a continuum of sunspot equilibria can also be constructed. (For the analysis of sunspot equilibrium in a richer model of coordination failures, see Cole and Kehoe 2000.) The multiplicity of equilibria in our sequential move game does not arise from this kind of coordination problem per se. Consider, for example, a full information version of our game in which lenders move sequentially. It is easy to show that multiple equilibria cannot occur in this game. The multiplicity of equilibria in our game arises from the delicate interplay between strategic complementarity and private information.
It is important to stress that our results about the hot money nature of capital flows is not driven by sunspots connecting different equilibria without sunspots. Rather, our results stem from the realization of the intrinsic uncertainty, the order and type of signals, in a given equilibrium. 
